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Abstract
We attempt here to trace the evolution of Frege’s thought about truth. What
most frames the way we approach the problem is a recognition that hardly
any of Frege’s most familiar claims about truth appear in his earliest work.
We argue that Frege’s mature views about truth emerge from a fundamental
re-thinking of the nature of logic instigated, in large part, with a sustained
engagement with the work of George Boole and his followers, after the publica-
tion of Begriffsschrift and the appearance of critical reviews by members of the
Boolean school.
There could hardly be more disagreement about the role that the
notion of truth does or does not play in Gottlob Frege’s philosophy. Accord-
ing to the influential interpretation developed by Sir Michael Dummett
(1981), Frege’s contribution to modern logic was not simply the intro-
duction of the notion of quantification and, with it, a formal language
adequate for the purposes of mathematics. Frege also provided a seman-
tic theory for his formal language, one that was similar in spirit (and
in places in detail) to the theories of truth developed by Alfred Tarski
(1958) in the 1930s. Such now familiar doctrines as that the meaning of a
sentence is its truth-condition are central to Frege’s work and justify our
regarding him as the founding father (or, at least, grandfather) of formal
semantics and philosophy of language, as well as of mathematical logic.
On the other side, defenders of the so-called universalist interpretation of
Frege, such as Thomas Ricketts (1997), hold that deep features of Frege’s
philosophy precluded him from even attempting to give a semantic the-
ory for his formal language. In a similar vein, many philosophers have
supposed that Frege is some sort of deflationist, in light of his remark
in “On Sense and Reference” that “the sentence ‘The thought that 5 is a
prime number is true’ contains. . . the same thought as the simple ‘5 is a
prime number’ ” (SM, op. 34; cf. MBLI, p. 251).
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Our sympathies are with Dummett, and our goal here is to defend,
extend, and amend his interpretation. We will begin by arguing that
the texts usually taken to support the deflationary interpretation do not
really do so. But we think there are other texts that do support that
sort of reading. That is because the semantic perspective that Dummett
finds in Frege’s mature philosophy is almost wholly absent from his
earliest work, in particular, from Begriffsschrift. Indeed, as we shall see,
semantic notions do not appear explicitly in Frege’s corpus until the early
1890s, though they seem to have been implicit in his work as early as
1884. The interesting question, historically, is why Frege’s thinking took
this ‘semantic turn’. But the question is not just of historical interest.
Understanding why Frege took the semantic turn can only contribute
to our own understanding of what is involved in our continuing to do so
ourselves.
1 The Regress Argument
Much of the existing discussion of Frege’s views on truth focuses on an
argument he gives for the conclusion that truth is indefinable. This ar-
gument, which has come to be known as the ‘regress argument’, appears
in at least two places: the late essay, “Thoughts” (Tht, op. 60), written
around 1917, and an unfinished essay, “Logic”, which the editors of the
Nachlass date to 1897. Here is the argument as it occurs in “Logic”:1
Now it would be futile to employ a definition in order to make
it clearer what is to be understood by ‘true’. If, for example,
we wished to say that ‘an idea is true if it agrees with reality’,
nothing would have been achieved, since in order to apply this
definition we should have to decide whether some idea or other
did agree with reality. Thus we should have to presuppose
the very thing that is being defined. The same would hold
good of any definition of the form ‘A is true if and only if it
has such-and-such properties or stands in such-and-such a
relation to such-and-such a thing’. In each case in hand it
would always come back to the question whether it is true
that A has such-and-such properties, stands in such-and-
such a relation to such-and-such a thing. Truth is obviously
something so primitive and simple that it is not possible to
reduce it to anything still simpler. (Log97, pp. 128–9)
1 Dirk Greimann (2015) offers a very different interpretation of this passage.
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Some commentators have found in this passage an argument that there
is no real property of truth at all (Kemp, 1995; Ricketts, 1996, §II), which
of course fuels the deflationary reading of Frege. But we do not think the
argument supports that conclusion.
The regress argument is extremely puzzling. Its first part contains
what looks like a complete non sequitur. Frege insists that the question
“whether some idea or other [does] agree with reality. . . presuppose[s] the
very thing that is being defined”, the notion of truth. But where? Truth
does not seem to be mentioned at all, unless it is supposed somehow to
be hidden in the notion of agreement. But that is hardly plausible. The
later parts of the argument read differently. There Frege insists that
it is not enough to ask whether an idea agrees with reality; we must
ask whether it is true that the idea agrees with reality. But that seems
gratuitous. Surely it is possible to ask whether 5 is prime without asking
whether it is true that 5 is prime, let alone whether it is true that it is
true that 5 is prime, and so on ad infinitum. Indeed, if it is not, then
there looks to be a threat of regress whether truth is definable or not.
What is supposed to grease these apparent slides is revealed by
remarks that follow the regress argument proper:
What, in the first place, distinguishes [‘true’] from all other
predicates is that predicating it is always included in predicat-
ing anything whatever. If I assert that the sum of 2 and 3 is 5,
then I thereby assert that it is true that 2 and 3 make 5. So I
assert that it is true that my idea of Cologne Cathedral agrees
with reality, if I assert that it agrees with reality. Therefore,
it is really by using the form of an assertoric sentence that
we assert truth, and to do this we do not need the word ‘true’.
(Log97, p. 129)
Frege is thus claiming that every assertion is, of its very nature, an
assertion of truth. And every judgement is a judgement of truth.
Frege makes this sort of claim in other places, too, for example, in
“On Sense and Reference”, where he writes: “A judgement, for me, is not
the mere grasping of a thought, but the admission of its truth” (SM, op.
34, note). This view is central to Frege’s mature conception of logic. In
many of his writings from just after the publication of Begriffsschrift,
Frege emphasizes that he “did not wish to present an abstract logic in
formulas, but to express a content through written symbols in a more
precise and perspicuous way than is possible with words” (AimCN, pp.
90–1). Frege’s logic was to be one we can actually use in reasoning, in
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proving theorems, where theorems are true contents. So logic issues in
judgements.
It is important to appreciate, however, that the judgements in which
logic issues need not themselves be logical truths. In Frege’s own work,
of course, he proves only theorems of logic, since he is particularly con-
cerned with the question how much mathematics is implicit in logic
itself. But Frege clearly anticipated and expected that his logic would
eventually be expanded to include parts of ‘science’ that were not logical
in character, for example, geometry. In principle, that is, Frege would
have been perfectly happy to add the axioms of Euclidean geometry to
his system as basic, underived principles from which proofs might begin.
These would not be logical principles, so the theorems proven from them
would not (typically) be logical theorems. But the very same logical
inferences and Basic Laws that permit us to prove, say, the transitivity
of the ancestral are also what permit us to derive Euclid’s results from
the axioms of geometry. That is the sense in which logic is supposed to
be universal, or topic-neutral.
Frege’s insistence that logic issues in judgements should not, then,
be taken to limit the scope of logic to the deriviation of logical truths.
Rather, Frege’s point is that logic operates on judgements (Geo2, op.
387). Inferences, as Frege understands them, are not just transitions
between thoughts but transitions between judgements. But not just any
transition between judgements counts as an inference, let alone as a
valid one—the sort of inference of which logic must take notice. Logic
is interested only in inferences that are “so constituted that, if a new
proposition is derived from true propositions in accordance with them, it
too is true” (Gg, II, §104). Logic, that is to say, is interested only in rules
of inference that are truth-preserving.
But why is logic interested only in logical transitions between judge-
ments that are truth-preserving? The answer, for Frege, is connected
with logic’s ambition to contribute to the growth of knowledge: “Knowl-
edge must stand as the goal”, he tells us, “and everything that occurs
must be determined thereby” (Gg, II, §92). Indeed, Frege seems to think
that the transition from, e.g., “8 > 6” and “3 + 5 = 8” to “3 + 5 > 6” is
licensed only in so far as the goal is knowledge (Gg, II, §104). If our
goal were to create pretty wallpaper, for example, then perhaps that
‘transition’ would not be allowed. But if our goal is knowledge, then it is,
because the inference is guaranteed to be truth-preserving.
To put it differently, Frege thinks of judgement as having an aim
that logic helps us achieve. Judgement aims at knowledge and therefore
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at truth, and reasoning in accord with the principles of logic guards
one against straying from the path to truth. Frege’s logic improves
on what preceded it not so much by articulating modes of reasoning
that are guaranteed to be truth-preserving—both Aristotle and George
Boole managed that much—but by providing us with a rigorous way of
determining whether some chain of reasoning has in fact restricted itself
to those reliable modes. But here again, reasoning means: transitions
between judgements. And the truth-preserving transitions are of special
interest only because judgement has a peculiarly intimate relation to
truth. It is this intimate relationship between judgement and truth that
Frege is trying to articulate when he says that every judgement is a
judgement of truth.
This view, that “predicating [truth] is always included in predicating
anything whatever” (Log97, p. 129), seems to be one that Frege held
throughout his career. But he understood this thesis in different ways at
different times. Consider the following passage from Begriffsschrift:
We can imagine a language in which the proposition “Archime-
des perished at the capture of Syracuse” would be expressed
thus: “The violent death of Archimedes at the capture of
Syracuse is a fact”. To be sure, one can distinguish between
subject and predicate here, too, if one wishes to do so, but the
subject contains the whole content, and the predicate serves
only to turn the content into a judgement. Such a language
would have only a single predicate for all judgements, namely,
“is a fact”. . . . Our begriffsschrift is a language of this sort, and
in it the sign ` is the common predicate for all judgements.
(Bg, §3, emphasis original)
These remarks come at the conclusion of Frege’s explanation of why
the “distinction between subject and predicate does not occur in [his]
way of representing a judgement” (Bg, §3). It is tempting, therefore,
to regard them as but a grudging concession to tradition. But note
how Frege emphasizes the final sentence of the quoted passage. This
is something he does throughout Part I of Begriffsschrift when he is
articulating the central features of his new conception of logic.2 Frege is
thus saying here, as explicitly and emphatically as he can, that it is one
of the characteristic features of his formal language that, in it, there is
only one (real) predicate: the assertion-sign.
2 One can verify this fact by looking through Part I. Such emphasized remarks appear,
for example, at the end of §1, §2, §3 (the one we just quoted), and §4.
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What is perhaps most striking is Frege’s claim that “the predicate [‘is
a fact’] serves. . . to turn [a] content into a judgement”. This language is
reminiscent of remarks Frege makes about the assertion-sign earlier in
Begriffsschrift: When that sign is absent, we have “a mere combination
of ideas”, but a “content becomes a judgement when ` is written before
its sign. . . ” (Bg, §2). So Frege is telling us that assertion is achieved
through the predication of facthood, and that this is expressed in his new
logic by the assertion-sign.3
This very idea is explicitly criticized in Frege’s later work—though,
as often, Frege does not own up to the fact that he is criticising his own
earlier view. Frege writes in “On Sense and Reference”:
One might be tempted to regard the relation of the thought
to the True not as that of sense to reference, but rather as
that of subject to predicate. One can indeed say: “The thought
that 5 is a prime number is true”. But closer examination
shows that nothing more has been said than in the simple
sentence “5 is a prime number”. The truth claim arises in
each case from the form of the assertoric sentence, and when
the latter lacks its usual force, e.g., in the mouth of an actor
upon the stage, even the sentence “The thought that 5 is a
prime number is true” contains only a thought, and indeed
the same thought as the simple “5 is a prime number”. It
follows that the relation of the thought to the True may not
be compared with that of subject to predicate. (SM, op. 34)
As we have already mentioned, Frege’s claim that the attribution of
truth adds nothing to the sense is often interpreted as an expression
of a deflationary attitude towards truth. But Frege’s central point here
does not depend upon that claim, which arguably conflicts with his other
views about sense.4 Frege’s main point in this passage is that one cannot
3 As Ian Proops (1997) points out, Ludwig Wittgenstein ascribes this view to Frege:
“The verb of a proposition is not ‘is true’ or ‘is false’, as Frege thought; rather, that which
‘is true’ must already contain the verb” (Wittgenstein, 1961, 4.063; see also Wittgenstein,
1979a, pp. 93, 100). Proops was the first to notice Frege’s commitment to this view in
Begriffsschrift.
4 There are several places in Frege’s writings where he makes claims of sameness of
sense that one might think he really ought not make, e.g., that “A ∧ B” has the same
sense as “B ∧A” (CT, op. 39). Frege is led to make such claims, we would argue, by an
incorrect application of his famous criterion for difference of sense: that one should be
able to believe p but not q. As Frege usually applies that criterion, it acts as a sufficient
condition for difference of sense. Sometimes, however, he seems to apply it as if it were a
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assert a thought just by predicating truth of it. Whether doing so changes
what thought is expressed is irrelevant. Even if “The thought that 5 is
a prime number is true” and “5 is a prime number” express different
thoughts, the former no more contains a judgement than does the latter.
Frege mentions the theater to make this point, but he might equally
have mentioned conditionals such as: If the thought that 5 is a prime
number is true, then there are odd primes. Frege famously emphasizes
elsewhere (e.g. BLC, p. 11; IntLog, pp. 185–6) that the antecedents of
conditionals are not, in any sense, asserted, and that remains the case
even when the word ‘true’ appears in the antecedent.
Just because one has predicated truth of a thought, then, one has not
necessarily made the judgement with that thought as its content. But
there is, of course, another sense of ‘predicate’, in which one does not
predicate whiteness of snow if one merely supposes that snow is white,
but does predicate whiteness of snow if one judges that snow is white.
So one might suggest that it is only in this other sense that judging
involves predicating truth of a thought. What the regress argument
shows is that this cannot be right. Predication in this other sense is itself
a sort of judgement, at least according to Frege (IntLog, p. 185): If so,
however, then to predicate truth of the thought that p is just to judge
that the thought that p is true, that is, to judge that it is true that p.
If so, however, then judging that it is true that p is predicating truth
of the thought that it is true that p, that is, judging that it is true that
it is true that p. And now we really have started a regress. Moreover,
the regress is vicious, since the sense in which judgement is predication
of truth was meant to be constitutive.5 So it is not just that to “assert
truth. . . we do not need the word ‘true’ ”, as Frege puts it in “Logic”. The
right conclusion to draw is that judgement is not predication of truth, in
any sense.
In place of that view, Frege offers his mature view that “the relation of
the thought to the True [is] that of sense to reference” (SM, op. 34). Frege
thus does not abandon the idea that there is an intimate relationship
necessary condition, but it has no plausibility as a necessary condition, and taking it to
be one conflicts with other of Frege’s views about sense (Heck and May, 2010, §5, esp. n.
72). That is true here, too. The sentence “The thought that 5 is a prime number is true”
refers to a thought, just as “John believes that 5 is a prime number” does, whereas “5 is
a prime number” does not refer to a thought but only to a number (cf. Moore, 1953, p.
276). So they cannot have the same sense.
5 It would not be vicious if the claim were, say, merely one about the commitments
one incurs by making a judgement, as Dummett (1981, ch. 13) makes clear.
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between judgement and truth. Rather, he reconceives the nature of
that relationship. He originally thought that judgement was predication
of truth (or facthood). But the regress argument refutes that view:
Judgement might in some sense involve the acceptance of thoughts
‘as true’, but we cannot understand what that means in terms of the
thinker’s predicating truth of a thought. Fundamentally, then, truth is
not a property of thoughts: The most fundamental relation in which a
thought stands to its truth-value is not the relation of subject to predicate
but that of sense to reference.
One might well say, therefore, that Frege’s objection to the predica-
tional view is that it does not give truth a role that is central enough.
Judging that 5 is prime has to involve something more than merely
entertaining the thought that 5 is prime, but what more judgement adds
cannot be understood in terms of our predicating truth of this thought.
The problem is that predication happens at the level of the thought: The
thought that p is true is just another thought (and again, it does not
really matter whether it is the same thought or a different one). What
we do in judgement, by contrast, is to take “the step from the level of
thoughts to the level of reference” (SM, op. 34), and that is where the
True and the False are properly to be located.6
This is, we think, a promising and underappreciated idea, quite at
odds with the way philosophers nowadays tend to think about truth.7 At
least since Tarski (1958), philosophical discussions of truth have tended
to focus on the so-called ‘truth-predicate’. What Frege is telling us is that
this focus is misplaced. The study of truth must not be confused with the
study of how the word “true” is or should be used in natural language.
The notion of truth must already be in place before we can even begin to
discuss the use of “true”, because a distinction between truth and falsity
is implicit in the act of judgement itself. Such a distinction must, as
6 It does not follow that there is no property had by all and only thoughts that refer to
the True. Indeed, we have just said which property that is. Still, it is easy to understand
why some commentators have been tempted to read Frege as arguing for the stronger
conclusion that there is no property of truth at all. So to read him, however, is to miss
what is really at issue, which is a question about how we should understand the relation
between a thought and its truth-value. There is such a relation, and so there is such a
property, but that property is not what is fundamental. Rather, it is derivative from the
relation between a thought and its truth-value.
7 Something like this view is also to be found in Donald Davidson (1984; 1990; 2005),
Dummett (1978; 1991, chs. 1–6; 1993b), and David Wiggins (1980), among others. Dorit
Bar-On and Keith Simmons (2007), Mark Textor (2010), and Walter B. Pedriali (2017)
discuss this aspect of Frege’s view, as does Dummett (1981, esp. chs. 10 and 12).
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Frege puts it, be “recognized. . . by everybody who judges something to be
true—and so even by a skeptic” (SM, op. 34).
A similar point is expressed by Sir Peter Strawson when he writes:8
The occurrence in ordinary discourse of the words “fact”,
“statement”, “true” signalizes the occurrence of [fact-stating]
discourse. . . . If our task were to elucidate the nature of [this]
type of discourse, it would be futile to attempt to do so in
terms of the words “fact”, “statement”, “true”, for those words
contain the problem not its solution. It would, for the same
reason, be equally futile to attempt to elucidate any one of
these words (in so far as the elucidation of that word would
be the elucidation of this problem) in terms of the others. And
it is, indeed, very strange that people have so often proceeded
by saying, “Well, we’re pretty clear about what a statement is,
aren’t we? Now let us settle the further question, viz., what it
is for a statement to be true.” This is like “Well, we’re clear
about what a command is: now what is it for a command
to be obeyed?” (Strawson, 1950, p. 141, emphasis original,
punctuation corrected)
And it is very strange. Or, to put it differently, it should not be at all
surprising that, if you are prepared to assume that you know what
statements are, then you should find that there is nothing left to say
about what it is for a statement to be true. But that is not because there
is nothing substantial to be said about truth. It is because what there is
to be said about it must be said in the course of ‘elucidating’ the nature
of judgement or, perhaps, the contents of judgements, which is what
Strawson means by a ‘statement’.
Our goal here, however, is not to try to develop Frege’s idea that truth
and falsity are the references of sentences. Rather, in the remainder
of this paper, we want to try to understand the origins of this now
negelected view.
8 This remark, we suggest, makes it far less clear that it is usually supposed to be that
Strawson is any kind of deflationist. He thinks there is little interesting to be said about
the use of the word “true”, but he thinks there is a different problem, that of “elucidating
the fact-stating type of discourse” (Strawson, 1950, p. 142), that is well worth pursuing.
That, according to Strawson, is where the philosophical puzzles about truth really lie,
even though Strawson himself reserves the label “the problem of truth” for questions
about “true”. But that is just a consequence of the intellectual culture in which Strawson
was working.
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2 The Truth-Value Thesis
According to Frege, truth is the real subject-matter of logic. As he puts it
in a now famous passage:9
Just as ‘beautiful’ points the way for aesthetics and ‘good’ for
ethics, so does the word ‘true’ for logic. All sciences have truth
as their goal; but logic is also concerned with it in a quite
different way: logic has much the same relation to truth as
physics has to weight or heat. To discover truths is the task of
all sciences; it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth. (Tht,
op. 58)
It is therefore unsurprising that many of Frege’s best known doctrines
involve the notion of truth: Truth-values are the references of sentences;
concepts are functions from objects to truth-values; negation and the
conditional are truth-functions; the sense of a sentence is its truth-
condition.
These doctrines are, of course, inter-related and mutually supporting.
The thesis that sentences refer to truth-values implies that the sentential
connectives denote truth-functions, given that they denote some sort
of function or other: The sentences that occur as arguments of the
conditional refer to truth-values, and so does the conditional itself; so
if the conditional denotes a function, then it must denote a function
from truth-values to truth-values. Similarly, the thesis that predicates
refer to functions from objects to truth-values follows from the thesis that
sentences refer to truth-values, given three of Frege’s other commitments:
that predicates refer to functions; that names refer to objects; and that
the semantic value of a sentence “Fa” is the result of applying the
function to which “Fξ” refers to the object to which “a” refers.10 For
consider such a sentence. We know that ‘Fξ’ must denote a function and
that ‘a’ must denote an object. So the arguments to the function ‘Fξ’ are
objects, and if the reference of ‘Fa’ is to be a truth-value, then the values
9 These remarks were written around 1918 and so are from very late in Frege’s career.
Similar remarks are found, however, both in Frege’s unpublished “Logic” from 1897
(Log97, p. 128) and, a little less explicitly, in an earlier piece by the same title (Log79,
p. 3). We believe that piece is from after 1882, as we shall see, Frege shows no (other)
interest in truth before that time.
10 This last doctrine reflects Frege’s view that semantic composition is, in a sense we try
to explain elsewhere (Heck and May, 2013, §4), ‘internal’ to the semantics of predicates.
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of the function must be truth-values. So ‘Fξ’ denotes a function from
objects to truth-values.11
We have argued elsewhere (Heck and May, 2010, §4) that the thesis
that the sense of a sentence is its truth-condition is also a consequence of
Frege’s conception of how thoughts are composed from senses, given that
sentences refer to truth-values. And it is, or so we suggested in the last
section, because sentences refer to truth-values—a claim that is itself a
reflection of the intimate link between judgement and truth—that logic
is constitutively concerned with truth. The most fundamental of Frege’s
mature doctrines about truth is thus the thesis that sentences refer to
their truth-values or, as we shall call it, the Truth-Value Thesis. It is on
it that the other doctrines rest.
It is important to distinguish the Truth-Value Thesis, as Frege him-
self does not, from the related thesis that truth-values are objects. As
Dummett (1981, ch. 12) has emphasized, given the fact that, for Frege,
ontological categories supervene on syntactic ones, the latter thesis is
all but equivalent to the claim that sentences are a sort of proper name.
That is, Frege holds quite generally that what kind of entity something
is—an object, concept, or function of whatever type—is determined by
what kind of expression might refer to it (Dummett, 1981, chs. 3–4). If
so, then the claim that truth-values are objects becomes the claim that
sentences (which are the kinds of expressions that refer to truth-values)
are of the same logical type as the expressions normally fit to refer to
objects, proper names. It should be obvious that this syntactic thesis is
independent of the thesis that sentences refer to their truth-values.12
As Dummett also makes clear, the claim that sentences refer to things,
while it sounds odd to the modern ear, should not be doubted on that
ground.13 Frege’s notion of reference, though grounded intuitively in
the relation between a name and its bearer, is a technical one, to be
11 Frege holds similar views about predicates of other logical types. For example, a
two-place predicate like ‘ξ loves η’ refers, on Frege’s view, to a two-place function from
objects to truth-values: it refers to a two-place, first-level concept. Higher-level concepts
take concepts (more generally, functions) as arguments and have truth-values as their
values. Quite generally, then, predicates refer to functions from arguments of some
appropriate type (or types) to truth-values.
12 In their semantics textbook Knowledge of Meaning, Larson and Segal (1995) treat
sentences as referring to truth-values, but do not regard sentences as being a special
sort of proper name.
13 Frege’s German term is “bedeuten”, whose most natural translation is “meaning”.
But that does not help a great deal, since the thesis that sentences ‘mean’ their truth-
values sounds odd for a different reason.
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explicated, ultimately, in terms of the theoretical work it is supposed
to do (Dummett, 1981, pp. 196–203). That work is semantic, which is
why Dummett suggests we might use the term “semantic value” for the
general notion Frege has in mind, perhaps reserving “reference” for the
special case of proper names.
The role that truth is supposed to play in logic is clearest from Frege’s
own elaboration of his formal system in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik.
Part I of that book, entitled “Exposition of the System”, is intended, first
and foremost, to introduce and explain the system of logic in which Frege
proposes to give his “Proofs of the Basic Laws of Cardinal Number” in
Part II. But Frege’s goal in Part I is not, in our view, just expository.14
Frege’s overall goal in Grundgesetze is to show “that arithmetic is merely
logic further developed” (Gg, v. I, p. vii), but the provision of formal
proofs of axioms for arithmetic, though necessary for this goal—since,
otherwise, something intuitive might intrude unnoticed (Gl, §90)—is not
sufficient. The question remains whether the Basic Laws from which
the proofs themselves proceed, and the inferences that constitute those
proofs, are logical in character (PCN, opp. 362–3). Only if that is so will
the theorems of Frege’s system be guaranteed to be truths of logic.
The real goal of Part I, then, is to secure this additional claim: to
demonstrate that each of Frege’s six Basic Laws is true and to show
that each of his rules of inference preserves truth. These arguments de-
pend, as they must, upon a series of stipulations Frege makes regarding
the meanings of the primitive expressions of his formal language, his
‘begriffsschrift’.15 For example, he stipulates that a conditional
Γ
∆
is to have as its value the False only if ∆ is the True and Γ is the False
(Gg, v. I, §11), and he then uses this stipulation to prove that his Basic
14 Heck (2012a, Part I) gives detailed arguments for this claim.
15 Eva Picardi (1996, p. 318) puts a closely related point thus:
Even a superficial reader of [Grundgesetze] soon realizes that without the
account of how a sentence of the formal language is determined as true—
the sense expressed by an assertion of a sentence of [Grundgesetze] being
the thought that its truth-conditions are fulfilled [(Gg, v. I, §32)]—Frege
would have not a shade of an argument for opposing the doctrines both of
psychologistic logicians and of formalist mathematicians.






is true (Gg, v. I, §18) and that his first method of inference, modus ponens,
preserves truth (Gg, v. I, §14).
Frege makes similar stipulations concerning the other primitives,16
and these stipulations together comprise an informal, but nonetheless
rigorous,17 semantic theory for begriffsschrift. Frege goes on to argue in
§31 that what he has stipulated concerning his primitives is adequate to
assign a unique denotation to every expression of begriffsschrift. Specif-
ically, his stipulations are adequate to assign a unique truth-value to
every sentence and, therefore, to determine the condition under which
any given sentence of the language will be true (Gg, v. I, §32). In that
sense, Frege’s semantics is ‘materially adequate’, in roughly Tarski’s
sense: For each sentence S of the language, it allows us to prove some-
thing of the form
S refers to the True iff p
where p is a translation of the formal sentence S into our informal meta-
language.
To be sure, the argument Frege gives in §31 is fatally flawed. If,
indeed, every sentence of begriffsschrift had a unique truth-value as its
reference, then we could argue for the consistency of the begriffsschrift
as follows: It follows from the stipulations Frege makes concerning his
primitives that all of his Basic Laws refer to the True and, moreover,
that his rules of inference preserve the property of referring to the True;
but then, by a simple induction, every theorem refers to the True; yet
there is at least one sentence (e.g., a a 6= a) that does not refer to the
True; hence, not every sentence can be a theorem, and the begriffsschrift
must be consistent. Since it isn’t, something has gone wrong, a point
Frege recognizes himself in one of his letters to Russell (PMC, p. 132).
But the fact that the argument of §31 is flawed does not imply that
it does not tell us something important about how Frege thought about
16 That concerning the horizontal is in §5; negation, §6; identity, §7; the first-order
universal quantifer, §8; the smooth breathing, §9; the definite article, §11; and the
second-order universal quantifer, §24.
17 One almost as rigorous as the semantics for the calculus of classes that Tarski
develops in §3 of “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” (Tarski, 1958), which
is also stated in an informal meta-theory and is in no sense ‘formal’.
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his formal language and its relation to truth. Indeed, although the
argument is flawed, its shortcomings are due entirely to peculiarities
connected with the stipulation Frege makes concerning the spiritus lenis,
or ‘smooth breathing’, which is used to form names of value-ranges and
which is the subject of the infamous Basic Law V. If we omit the smooth
breathing, then Frege’s argument really does show that every expression
of the ‘logical fragment’ of begriffsschrift has been provided with a unique
denotation and a definite truth-condition.18
The claim that sentences ‘refer’ to their truth-values is of course at the
foundation of Frege’s semantics for begriffsschrift: The ‘semantic value’
of a sentence is its truth-value, as Frege’s stipulation concerning the
conditional makes clear. In that respect, then, the Truth-Value Thesis
is actually quite familiar: The sort of semantics we teach in elementary
logic embodies the same idea, that the fundamental semantic fact about
a sentence is that it is true or false, that is, that it has whatever truth-
value it has. Nonetheless, the Truth-Value Thesis seems to many just
strange, and it does not help that Frege gives almost no explicit argument
for it. The few arguments he does give are in “On Sense and Reference”,
and they are weak.
The first of these arguments is that it only matters to us whether a
name refers in so far as we are concerned with the truth-value of some
sentence in which it occurs. That may be, but we are hardly “driven into
accepting the truth-value of a sentence as constituting what it refers
to” (SM, op. 34) by this sort of consideration. For it might well be that
(i) we are only interested in the reference of a sentence when we are
interested in its truth-value and (ii) what the reference of the sentence is
depends upon the references of the names that are contained in it. If so,
then we would indeed be interested in the reference of a name only when
concerned with the truth-value of some sentence containing it. But if a
sentence referred to a fact, or a state of affairs, then (ii) would certainly
be true, and one can at least imagine a plausible argument for (i), i.e.,
that we are interested in what state of affairs a sentence refers to only
when we are interested in its truth-value. But even if that were not so,
then that would be because there were cases in which were interested
in the reference of a name because we were interested in what state of
affairs a sentence ‘expressed’, even though we were not interested in
18 And one can then prove that the logical fragment of the begriffsschrift is consistent,
in much the same way that Tarski (1958, p. 199, Theorem 7) proves that the calculus of
classes is. This is not a terribly interesting result, however, since the logical fragment
has a two-element model.
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whether that sentence was true. And then Frege’s argument has a false
premise.
Frege’s second argument is a little better, but not much:
If our supposition that the reference of a sentence is its truth-
value is correct, then the latter must remain unchanged when
a part of the sentence is replaced by an expression with the
same reference. And this is in fact the case. . . . If we are
dealing with sentences for which the meaning of their com-
ponent parts is at all relevant, then what feature except the
truth-value can be found that belongs to such sentences quite
generally and remains unchanged by substitutions of the kind
just mentioned? (SM, op. 35)
This is usually interpreted as an attempt to derive the Truth-Value
Thesis from the compositionality of reference, that is, from the claim that
the reference of a complex expression is determined by the references of
its parts. But it too is unconvincing. What the argument certainly does
show is that it is consistent with compositionality to take sentences to
refer to their truth-values, but it does not follow that sentences refer to
truth-values unless there is no other view with that is consistent with
compositionality. And the view that sentences refer to states of affairs
might well be thought to be just such a view.
Why are Frege’s arguments for the Truth-Value Thesis so terrible?
The answer is simple: He doesn’t really have a direct argument for
it. But these are clearly not the sorts of considerations that might
plausibly have led him to it, anyway. A better indication of why Frege
adopted the Truth-Value Thesis is a remark he makes in the Foreword
to Grundgesetze: “Only a thorough engagement with the present work
can teach how much simpler and more precise everything is made by
the introduction of truth-values” (Gg, v. I, p. x). Frege thinks that the
Truth-Value Thesis solves a lot of problems, and he thinks that it solves
them better than anything else on offer. That is the real reason he adopts
it.
To understand why Frege holds the Truth-Value Thesis, then, we
need to discover what problems he thinks it solves. And the key to that
task is the realization that not one of the distinctive doctrines about
truth that we listed at the beginning of this section is present in Frege’s
earliest work: Frege does not hold, in Begriffsschrift, that sentences
refer to truth-values, nor that concepts are functions from objects to
truth-values, nor that negation and the conditional are truth-functions.
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Indeed, there is hardly any mention of truth in Frege’s writings before
1890.
In the sections that follow, then, we shall explore these various doc-
trines in an effort to understand how, and in response to what pressures,
they emerge.
3 Concepts as Functions From Objects to Truth-Values
Let us focus first on Frege’s doctrine that concepts are functions from
objects to truth-values. The idea that concepts are functions is already
present in Begriffsschift. Frege presents the distinction between function
and argument as the key to his new analysis of generality, and the way
he explains that distinction (Bg, §9) is strikingly reminiscent of how
he explains the distinction between function and object in his mature
work (FC, op. 6). And, although Frege does not use the term “concept”
in Begriffsschrift, when he introduces the distinction between function
and argument, he does so by applying it to the sentence “Hydrogen is
lighter than carbon dioxide”. Frege says that, if we regard “hydrogen” as
replaceable by other expressions, then “. . . ‘hydrogen’ is the argument and
‘being lighter than carbon dioxide’ is the function. . . ” (Bg, §9). Obviously,
“being lighter than carbon dioxide” is a predicate, and so the upshot is
that we are to regard predicates, logically, as being functions.
Frege thus regarded a simple sentence like “5 is prime” as being
analyzable into a function and an argument. This might sound familiar,
but it is important to appreciate that this distinction is actually very
different from Frege’s mature distinction between concept and object.
Whereas the distinction between concept and object “is not made arbitrar-
ily, but founded deep in the nature of things” (FC, op. 31), the distinction
between function and argument “has nothing to do with the conceptual
content [but] comes about only because we view the expression [of that
conceptual content] in a particular way” (Bg, §9). What, on one way of
viewing “5 is prime”, we regard as a function, on another way of viewing
it, we may regard as an argument (Bg, §10). If we imagine “5” replaced
by other expressions, then we are regarding it as the argument. But
we may also imagine “is prime” replaced by other expressions. Then we
would be regarding it as the argument.
Frege could have made an analogous point in his mature period. He
would then have regarded “5 is prime” as most fundamentally composed
of a name, “5”, and a concept-expression, “ξ is prime”, where “ξ” indi-
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cates the ‘incompleteness’ that Frege then understood such expressions
to have. But one can also regard the sentence as saying something
like: Prime is something 5 is. In that case, one is thinking of the sen-
tence as being composed of the first-level predicate “ξ is prime” and the
second-level predicate “5x(Φx)”, a predicate that means something like:
is instantiated by 5. But this is not how Frege is thinking of matters in
Begriffsschrift. The analysis just described depends crucially upon the
distinction between first- and second-level predicates and, more gener-
ally, upon the notion of incompleteness or unsaturatedness, neither of
which is present in Begriffsschrift.
Perhaps what is most striking about Frege’s early distinction between
function and argument is that it is essentially a linguistic one. Frege’s
official view in Begriffsschrift would appear to be that functions are
expressions. If, in the sentence “5 is prime”, we take the argument to be
“5”, then the function is “the part that remains invariant in the expression”
when we replace “5” by other names, such as “7” or “12” (Bg, §9, our
emphasis). That is why we said, a few paragraphs ago, that the predicate
is to be regarded as a function.19
From this point of view, the question what the values of the function
“is prime” are supposed to be need never arise, and Frege never addresses
himself to this question. The only relevant remark would seem to be
in his introduction of his notation for generality, where he says that
“ a Φ(a)” “stands for the judgement that, whatever we may take for its
argument, the function is a fact” (Bg, §11). But it is utterly unclear what
this is supposed to mean (and the problem does not seem to be with the
translation). The function is a fact? Surely not. Frege must mean that,
for each argument, the value of the function is a fact. But what is its
value if it is not a fact? A non-fact? It would appear that Frege simply
had not thought such matters through.
Within just a couple years, however, Frege abandons the linguistic
view of functions and replaces it with a more modern view that regards
functions as mappings from arguments to values (Heck and May, 2013,
§28.3). And once this new view is in place, Frege can no longer avoid
the question what might be the values and arguments of the functions
associated with predicates. Moreover, Frege no longer considers the
argument of the function to be a name, but rather what the name stands
for. And Frege held already in Begriffsschrift that the content of a proper
19 For defense and elaboration of the claims made in the last few paragraphs, see our
paper “The Function is Unsaturated” (Heck and May, 2013), especially §28.2.
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name is the object it denotes (Bg, §8), so the arguments to what we shall
call ‘concept-functions’ are just objects.
What, however, might the values of concept-functions be? It is easy
enough to deduce Frege’s original answer by applying the sort of rea-
soning we used above. Consider a simple sentence “Fa”. Applying the
concept-function that is the content of “F ” to the object that is the con-
tent of “a” should yield the content of the complex expression that they
together constitute. But the content of “Fa” is ‘a content that can become
a judgement’, for short, a judgeable content. So Frege’s view in the early
1880s must have been the following: A proper name has as its content an
object; a predicate has as its content a function from objects to judgeable
contents; and the content of a sentence “Fa”, which is a content that can
become a judgement, is the result of applying the function that is the
content of “F ” to the object that is the content of “a”. It follows that the
content of “F ” is a function from objects to judgeable contents.20
This view is strikingly reminiscent of Russell’s notion of a propo-
sitional function (Russell, 1903, ch. VII) and is really quite elegant.
Unfortunately, as now well-known considerations show, it has conse-
quences that would have been unacceptable to Frege. If the content
of
(1) The Evening Star is a planet
is the result of applying the function that is the content of “ξ is a planet”
to the object that is the content of “the Evening Star”, then its content
must be the same as that of
(2) The Morning Star is a planet.
But (1) and (2) cannot have the same content. The point is not simply
that we have some ‘intuition’ that they do not (cf. Heck, 2014). The notion
of content that is in play here is not an ‘intuitive’ one but one whose
natural home is logic:
20 Michael Beaney (2007) comes to the same conclusion. Additional evidence is provided
by Frege’s remark in the preface to Grundgesetze that conceptual content “now splits
for me into what I call thought and what I call truth-value [as] a consequence of the
distinction between the sense and reference of a sign” (Gg, v. I, p. x). Frege’s language
here obviously suggests that the roles of (i) sentential content and (ii) the value of a
concept-function had previously been played by a single notion, and that this notion is
what has now split (functionally, not mereologically) into sense and reference. We have
discussed this point further elsewhere (Heck and May, 2006, §4).
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. . . [T]he contents of two judgements may differ in two ways:
either the consequences derivable from the first, when it is
combined with certain other judgements, always follow from
the second, when it is combined with these same judgements,
or this is not the case. The two propositions, “The Greeks
defeated the Persians at Plataea” and “The Persians were
defeated by the Greeks at Plataea” differ in the first way.
. . . Now I call that part of the content that is the same in both
the conceptual content. . . . Everything necessary for a correct
inference is expressed in full, but what is not necessary is
generally not indicated; nothing is left to guesswork. (Bg, §3,
emphasis in original)
Some readers, such as Robert Brandom (1994, pp. 94ff) and Michael
Kremer (2010), have claimed to find in this passage an argument for
the claim that, if A and B have the same consequences, then they must
also have the same content. We don’t read the passage that way, but the
issue is not relevant at the moment.21 What matters for our purposes is
only that a weaker thesis clearly is present: If A and B have the same
content, then they must have the same logical properties. If so, then
since it is obvious that (1) and (2) have different logical consequences,22
it follows that (1) and (2) must have different conceptual contents. We’ll
call this the ‘substitution argument’.
How can Frege avoid the conclusion that (1) and (2) must have the
same content? The conclusion depends upon just four assumptions:
(i) The content of a proper name is its bearer.
(ii) Concepts are functions.
(iii) The content of a simple sentence “Fa” is the result of applying the
concept-function that is the content of “F ” to the content of “a”.
(iv) Logical properties are determined by content, so that sameness of
content implies sameness of logical properties.
Only (iii) is dispensible: (ii) is the key to Frege’s understanding of logical
generality; (iv) is integral to Frege’s conception of logic and its relation
21 Even if we did read the passage that way, we would counsel against assuming that
it had any implications whatsoever for Frege’s mature views.
22 We take this to be obvious ourselves—although it can be and has been denied
(Marcus, 1995)—but, more importantly, we take it to have been obvious to Frege, i.e., we
take it that Frege would have thought it obvious.
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to content (May, 2006);23 and (i) is central to Frege’s understanding of
identity as objectual. This last view is not present in Begriffsschrift,
but it is in place by 1881 and is fundamental to Frege’s logicism (May,
2001; Heck and May, 2006; Heck, 2019). So, as said, (iii) is what Frege
must abandon: The content of “Fa” cannot be the result of applying the
concept-function that is the content of “F ” to the object that is the content
of “a”. To put it differently: The values of concept-functions cannot be
judgeable contents. So what are they?
We know, of course, what Frege’s answer to this question will ul-
timately be: The values of concept-functions are truth-values, so that
concepts are functions from objects to truth-values. So this thesis—and,
with it, the Truth-Value Thesis—is partly a result of Frege’s being forced
to re-think the question what the values of concept-functions are in light
of the substitution argument, which shows they cannot be judgeable
contents.
Another source of Frege’s mature view lies in how he proposes to
distinguish concepts from objects. As we mentioned earlier, the notion of
unsaturatedness, or incompleteness, does not appear in Begriffsschrift
or in any of Frege’s (extant) writings before 1881. It clearly is present,
however, by 1882, when Frege writes, in a letter to the philosopher Anton
Marty: “A concept is unsaturated in that it requires something to fall
under it; hence it cannot exist on its own” (PMC, p. 101). More important
for our purposes, however, is an earlier remark that the one just quoted
elaborates, that “it [is] essential for a concept that the question whether
something falls under it has a sense” (PMC, p. 101), a question that Frege
says would be senseless in the case of an object. What this suggests is
that Frege views concepts as sorting objects into two baskets: those that
fall under the concept and those that do not. The view that concepts are
functions from objects to truth-values fits naturally with this suggestion.
But such considerations cannot, on their own, have driven Frege to
the view that truth-values are the values of concept-functions, because
this view has deeply counter-intuitive consequences. In particular, it
implies that concepts are extensional, so that there can be only one
concept true of a given collection of objects. Suppose, for example, that
(as philosophers’ lore has it) the animals that are supposed to have
kidneys are the same as the animals that are supposed to have hearts.
Then the function that maps an animal to the truth-value True just in
23 It is (iv), of course, that Russellian responses to Frege’s puzzle about substitution
encourage us to abandon (Fine, 2007; Heck, 2012b).
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case that animal is supposed to have a kidney is the very same function
as the one that maps an animal to the True just in case that animal is
supposed to have a heart. So, if concepts are functions from objects to
truth-values, then the concepts renate and cordate are the same concept,
which is a deeply counterintuitive result. That is Frege’s mature view,
to be sure: concepts are extensional. But he did not start out with that
view.
The view that concepts are intensional is an almost immediate conse-
quence of Frege’s original view that concepts are functions from objects
to judgeable contents. On that view, is a renate maps Joe to Joe is a
renate, and is a cordate maps Joe to Joe is a cordate. Since the content
Joe is a cordate has different logical properties from the content Joe is a
renate, these are different contents, so the functions is a cordate and is a
renate are intensional: They take different values for Joe as argument.
Indeed, they take different values for every argument.
There is also direct textual evidence that Frege originally thought
that concepts were intensional. In “Boole’s Logical Calculus and the
Begriffsschrift”,24 Frege implicitly uses the thesis that concepts are
intensional as a premise in one of his main arguments:
The concept ‘planet whose distance from the sun lies between
that of Venus and that of Mars’ is still something different
from the individual object the Earth, even though [the Earth]
alone falls under the concept. Otherwise, you couldn’t form
concepts with different contents whose extensions were all
limited to this one thing, the Earth. (BLC, p. 18)
The argument Frege is giving here intended to establish a conclusion
that matters deeply to him: that we must distinguish concepts from
objects. The argument for that conclusion is simple: If every concept
true just of the Earth was identical with the Earth, then all concepts
true just of the Earth would be the same; but they aren’t—that is the
intensionality premise—so concepts true just of the Earth aren’t identical
with the Earth.25 Frege’s implicit claim that you can “form concepts with
24 This paper was not published by Frege during his lifetime, but the editors of the
Nachlass note that he submitted it for publication three times. We can thereby take it to
express his considered views at that time.
25 As Richard Cartwright once pointed out in a lecture, though in a slightly different
context, it is consistent with this argument that one concept true of just the Earth should
be identical with the Earth. It’s a nice question what additional premise is needed here.
Perhaps, Cartwright suggested, it is some form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
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different contents whose extensions [are] all limited to this one thing” is
thus one on which he is willing to put quite a lot of weight. And yet, he
feels no need to give an argument for it.
That the Boolean logicians treat objects as if they were concepts is, in
fact, one of Frege’s main criticisms of them. For Boole and his followers,
sentences were constructed from predicates using the traditional forms
of judgment. A universal affirmative judgment, for example, would be
constructed by inserting predicates into the form: All . . . are . . . . It
might seem as if this would make the famous argument
All humans are mortal.
Socrates is a human.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
difficult to handle. But the Booleans regarded proper names as simply a
special sort of predicate, ones that happen to be true of a single thing. In
particular, “Socrates” is a predicate, one that is true just of Socrates.26
The famous argument just mentioned could therefore be represented as:
All H are M .
All S are H.
Therefore, all S are M .
and it correctness is then evident.27
Frege repeats this criticism in Die Grundlagen, directing it at Ernst
Schröder, who was the most prominent of the German Booleans. Frege
emphasizes that “. . . a concept does not cease to be a concept simply
because only one single thing falls under it. . . ” (Gl, §51). And, of course,
the principle that concepts must, quite generally, be distinguished from
objects is one of the “three fundamental principles” that Frege lists in the
introduction to Die Grundlagen as crucial to the argument of the book
(Gl, p. x). The argument for this principle that Frege gives in “Boole’s
Logical Calculus” does not appear in Die Grundlagen, however, and the
reason is that Frege has by then abandoned the view that concepts are
intensional. In a footnote attached to his definition of number, Frege
writes:
I believe that for “extension of the concept” we could write
simply “concept”. But this would be open to two objections:
26 One might compare this idea to W. V. O. Quine’s famous suggestion that we might
verb all the names, e.g., replace “Pegasus” by “Pegasizes” (Quine, 1953).
27 We have discussed this objection of Frege’s in more detail elsewhere (Heck and May,
2006, §2).
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1. that this contradicts my earlier statement that the indi-
vidual numbers are objects. . . ;
2. that concepts can have identical extensions without them-
selves coinciding.
I am, as it happens, convinced that both these objections can
be met; but to do this would take us too far afield for present
purposes. (Gl, §68, fn. 1)
It is extremely unfortunate that Frege does not say how he would have
answered the second of these objections, that is, how he now proposes to
defend the view that concepts are extensional. But the prior question
is why he has abandoned his earlier view that concepts are intensional,
especially given how much more plausible that view seems to be. Both
questions, we think, have the same answer: Frege has been forced to
the view that concepts are extensional by his adoption of the view that
concepts are functions from objects to truth-values, and it is by appeal
to the latter view that he would defend the former one. The thesis that
concepts are functions from objects to truth-values must therefore be in
place by 1884, at the latest.
We pause to emphasize this point, because it is extremely important,
and much of what we shall have to say below depends upon it. So here
it is again: The view that concepts are functions from objects to truth-
values, and so one core piece of the Truth-Value Thesis, is already in
place by Die Grundlagen. Our argument for this claim is admittedly
indirect, but we simply cannot see how else one might explain why Frege
would have abandoned the natural view that concepts are intensional in
favor of the deeply problematic view that concepts are extensional, nor
how else one might suppose that Frege would have proposed to defend
his new view. The problem is made all the more difficult by the fact
that so much else has to be held fixed, e.g., the view that concepts are
functions, due to the role that claim plays, throughout Frege’s career, in
his analysis of generality.
There are a couple of counter-suggestions that might be made. As
Frege indicates in “On Concept and Object” (CO, op. 195, n. 6), his
response to the first objection is that the phrase “the concept F ”, which is
what one finds in the text on which Frege is commenting, refers not to a
concept but to an object, namely, the extension of that concept. One might
therefore suggest that Frege’s answer to the second objection would be
similar: He does not think that “concepts can have identical extensions
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without themselves coinciding”; he just thinks that the concept F cannot
differ from the concept G unless they have different extensions, since
these phrases themselves refer to extensions, not to concepts. But we do
not find that reading very plausible. This interpretation fails to explain
why the argument from “Boole’s Logical Calculus” does not reappear
in Die Grundlagen. Moreover, Frege seems to be indicating that he
thinks it is false that “concepts can have identical extensions without
themselves coinciding” (just as it is false that this terminological switch
would contradict his earlier view), not that the second objection fails to
engage with what he has said.
Alternatively, one might note that the view that concepts are func-
tions from objects to truth-values does not, by itself, entail that concepts
are extensional: Functions themselves might be intensional. If so, then
concepts will be intensional, too. So the natural suggestion is that Frege
had regarded functions as intensional before Die Grundlagen but now
regards them as extensional, and that is why he takes concepts to be
extensional in Die Grundlagen. The problem, however, is that the ex-
tensionality of functions does not, by itself, entail the extensionality
of concepts. The argument rehearsed earlier for the intensionality of
concepts did not depend upon the claim that functions are intensional.
If concepts are functions from objects to judgeable contents, then is a
cordate maps Joe to Joe is a cordate and is a renate maps Joe to Joe is a
renate, and so those functions map Joe to different values; it is irrelevant
whether the functions themselves are extensional. What is right, though,
is that the extensionality of concepts follows only from the combina-
tion of the these two views: that concepts are functions from objects to
truth-values and that functions are extensional. Frege’s abandonment
of the intensional view of concepts makes sense, therefore, only if he has
committed himself to both of these views by Die Grundlagen. It is the
commitment to the former view that matters here, though we do indeed
take these same considerations to show that the latter view was also in
place by 1884.
For what it’s worth, we think this probably does represent another
change in Frege’s views. As mentioned earlier, Frege does not clearly
distinguish functions from the expressions that denote them in Begriffss-
chrift. If so, then it would have been natural for him to regard x2− 1 and
(x+1)(x−1) as different functions. Frege abandons this view, presumably,
for much the same reason he abadons the view that identity is a rela-
tion between names: his emerging opposition to formalism (May, 2001),
which is firmly in place by Die Grundlagen (Gl, §§92–99) and which is
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the entire focus of his paper “Formal Theories of Arithmetic”, which was
published the next year. And once Frege has distinguished functions
from expressions, it becomes very natural for him also to regard functions
as extensional. As he himself points out (Gg, v. II. §147), mathematicians
of his day, no less than of ours, were often given to saying such things as
that x2 − 1 and (x + 1)(x − 1) are the same function. Frege objected to
such language on the ground that identity is a relation between objects,
and functions are not objects. But the functions may be regarded as
standing in a relation appropriate to their type that “corresponds to”
identity (CSM, p. 121), and that relation treats functions as extensional.
So the view that concepts are (extensional) functions from objects to
truth-values seems to have been in place by 1884. The fact that this view
has such counter-intuitive consequences makes it a nice question, again,
why Frege came to hold it. The answer, or so we have suggested, is that
Frege had by then arrived at the view that concepts are functions from
objects to truth-values. The question then becomes why Frege might
have adopted that view. And the answer, or so we have suggested, is
that it is a consequence, for reasons we have already considered, of the
Truth-Value Thesis: If (i) “Fa” denotes a truth-value, (ii) “a” denotes an
object, and (iii) the incomplete predicate symbol “Fξ” denotes a function
from the denotation of its argument to the denotation of the result of
completing it with that argument, then it simply follows that concepts—
what incomplete predicate symbols denote—are functions from objects to
truth-values. Indeed, the claim that concepts are functions from objects
to truth-values is simply equivalent to the Truth-Value Thesis, given
Frege’s other commitments.
We are suggesting, therefore, that Frege had settled upon the Truth-
Value Thesis by 1884. The question we must explore next, then, is why
that might be.
4 An Antinomy in Begriffsschrift?
We argued earlier that Frege was forced to abandon his original view
that concepts are functions from objects to judgeable contents by the
substitution argument, which purports to show that these two sentences:
(1) The Evening Star is a planet.
(2) The Morning Star is a planet.
25
must have the same content. A version of this argument, it turns out,
can be presented in the formal theory of Begriffsschrift. What makes the
formalization possible is the fact that there is, in the formal language
of Begriffsschrift, a symbol “≡” for what Frege calls ‘identity of content’:
The official reading of “A ≡ B” is “the sign A and the sign B have the
same conceptual content, so that we can everywhere put B for A and
conversely” (Bg, §8, emphasis removed). But the substitution argument
involves little more than an applicaton of Leibniz’s Law, which is proposi-
tion (52) of Begriffsschrift. The argument thus turns out to be very short
indeed:28
` c ≡ d→ [(Fc ≡ Fc)→ (Fc ≡ Fd)]
`Fc ≡ Fc
` c ≡ d→ Fc ≡ Fd
The first formula is the instance of Leibniz’s Law for “Fc ≡ Fξ”; the
second is an instance of proposition (54) of Begriffsschrift; the conclusion
then follows by modus ponens, more or less.29
It is hard to imagine that Frege would not have discovered this anti-
nomy himself. For one thing, this sort of substitution argument was dear
to Frege’s heart, being at the very center of “On Sense and Reference”.
For another, arguments of similar structure occur in Begriffschrift itself.
The proof of symmetry, which is proposition (55), involves the same se-
quence of steps, except that the instance of (52) that we need is the one
for “ξ ≡ c”:
` c ≡ d→ (c ≡ c→ d ≡ c)
` c ≡ c
` c ≡ d→ d ≡ c
Moreover, the conclusion of the argument we sketched, c ≡ d→ Fc ≡ Fd,
is relatively obvious, since it is just expresses a principle of composition-
28 We shall use modern notation here, and in other places where doing so makes no
significant difference.
29 As a special case—take “Fξ” to be “c ≡ ξ”—we have:
c ≡ d→ [(c ≡ c) ≡ (c ≡ d)]
which amounts to a formal refutation of the theory of identity in Begriffsschrift §8: Any
true identity-statement will have the same content as a triviality. Kremer (2010) also
notes the derivability of this formula. His proof involves substituting (c ≡ c) ≡ (c ≡ ξ)
into (52).
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ality for content: If you replace a part of a sentence with another with
the same content, then the content of the whole will be unchanged.
Indeed, one might have thought that Frege should have formulated
Leibniz’s Law not as:
` c ≡ d→ (Fc→ Fd), (52)
but instead as:
` c ≡ d→ Fc ≡ Fd, (52′)
which is simply the conclusion of the argument we are discussing. He
cannot do so, however, because we would not then know how to ‘do
anything’ with the consequent: The problem, in effect, is that we would
not then have an elimination rule for “≡”. It is (52) that functions as
such an elimination rule. But (52′) remains the natural form of Leibniz’s
Law.
How can Frege respond to this antimony? How, that is, can he prevent
(52′) from being a theorem of the system? His options are limited. One
idea would be to strengthen what “c ≡ d” means, taking it to be true
only if “c” and “d” have the same content in some sense stronger than
their simply denoting the same object. But even in Begriffsschrift, Frege
clearly thinks he needs to be able to express extensional identity—that
would seem to be the point of the discussion of identity in §8—and
Frege’s emerging logicism will quickly require a notion of objectual
identity, anyway (May, 2001). Even if that were not so, however, simply
weakening “c ≡ d” to “c = d” will not help if “=” it is still subject to the
same laws as “≡”, since then the antinomy will simply resurface as:
` c = d→ Fc ≡ Fd
So Frege has to do something about “≡” as it occurs in the consequent,
that is, as it appears between sentences.
One option that will seem natural to contemporary readers is to
declare that “≡” creates an opaque context and so that “Fc ≡ Fξ” is not
a valid substituend in Leibniz’s Law. And, in some sense, Frege has no
choice but to pursue this option. So long as “. . . has the same content
as. . . ” can legitimately be substituted into Leibniz’s Law, the antimony
will remain. So we might see Frege’s concern with intensional contexts
in the later parts of “On Sense and Reference” as part of his response to
the antinomy: It amounts to an explanation of why intensional contexts,
in general, cannot legimately be substituted into Leibniz’s Law.
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Still, Frege never explores anything like intensional logic, so the
suggestion we are considering must ultimately be that Frege should
simply remove “≡” from his system, or else to re-explain it so that it
does not create an opaque context. As we have said, this is undoubtedly
something Frege needs to do. But again, in Begriffsschrift, Frege seems
to think that he needs some such relation as that expressed by “≡” when
it appears between sentences: It plays a crucial role in the statements
of definitions, which are supposed to establish an identity of content.
For Frege, then, it remains an important question how “≡” should be
weakened: How, in the case of sentences, can we allow “A ≡ B” to be
true, even though “A” and “B” do not have the same content?
We might try re-interpreting “≡” in terms of mutual implication, that
is, either defining “A ≡ B” as “(A→ B) ∧ (B → A)” or else establishing
axioms that would have the same effect.30 That would certainly have
resolved the antinomy, but, so far as we know, Frege never considers
this option, even though it would have served his immediate purposes
in Begriffsschrift.31 As Frege mentions in “Boole’s Logical Calculus”,
he uses the triple bar “between contents of possible judgement almost
exclusively to stipulate the sense of a new designation” (BLC, pp. 35–6).
And, in Begriffsschrift, Frege only ever uses a definition  A ≡ B to infer
the conditionals ` A → B and ` B → A. However, re-interpreting “≡”
in terms of mutual implication would leave us with no obvious reason
to accept the sentential form (as it were) of proposition (52),32 which is
Frege’s form of Leibniz’s Law. Granted, as concerns sentential variables,
(52) is not used essentially in Begriffsschrift, except to permit inferences
from a definition to the corresponding conditionals. Given the definition
 A ≡ B, Frege then cites
` A ≡ B → (A→ B),
which is a kind of degenerate instance of (52), with “Fξ” being replaced
simply by “ξ”. This inference is made, for example, in the derivations of
30 As Alessandro Bandeira Duarte has pointed out, there is no way to derive the latter
from the former in Begriffsschrift. To see this, note that all the axioms remain true if “≡”
is taken to express some stronger notion of equivalence.
31 Though his concerns are very different, this kind of suggestion is made by Hugh
MacColl (1880, p. 51). We do not have any reason to think Frege read this paper, however,
which is not the one that Schröder cites in his review of Begriffsschrift (Schröder, 1972).
32 This might nowadays be formulated as: ` (A→ B∧B → A)→ (. . . A . . .→ . . . B . . . ),
where the dots indicate some context in which A and B occur, and in which the latter
has replaced the former.
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propositions (75), (89), and (105); a related inference is involved in the
proofs of (68) and (100).
To the modern eye, such an application of Leibniz’s Law just looks
weird. But, for Frege, (52) is what justifies the arbitrary replacement of
the definiendum by the definiens, no matter where or how deeply nested
the former might be. For example, Frege would have been perfectly
happy to use (52) to derive a proposition like:
` A ≡ B → [(C → A)→ (C → B)],
where now “Fξ” has been replaced by: C → ξ. Though such inferences do
not appear in Begriffsschrift, the further development of Frege’s system
can be expected to require them, and there are lots of inferences of this
sort in Grundgesetze.33 Such a use of (52) is actually dispensible, of
course, but that it is always dispensible is a significant meta-theorem,
and it is certainly not the sort of thing Frege anywhere proves.34
Re-interpreting “≡” in terms of mutual implication would also aban-
don something else Frege might have thought important: the idea that
“≡” expresses a sort of identity. This element of Frege’s view is not what
is responsible for the antinomy. The antinomy emerges not from the
formal result
` c ≡ d→ Fc ≡ Fd
but from how the consequent is being interpreted, in particular, from the
idea that its being true requires “Fc” and “Fd” to have the same content.
So, again, resolving the antinomy means weakening that relation: It will
have to be possible for “A ≡ B” to be true when A and B do not have the
same content. But, if we are to preserve the idea that “A ≡ B” expresses
some form of identity, then what is it that is the same?
That this is the right question to ask may well have been confirmed
for Frege by the work of Boole and his followers, and, as we have already
seen, Frege was intensely engaged with the work of the Booleans in the
33 More precisely, Frege uses the equivalent of (52), his Basic Law III, to justify the
arbitrary replacement of an expression with one proven equivalent to it, where the
equivalence often rests upon a definition. See, for example, theorems (22), (23), and (33),
and how they are applied.
34 In most settings, it is enough to have Leibniz’s Law for atomic formulas. One can
then show, by induction on the complexity of expressions, that it will also be provable for
complex formulas. Something similar is true in the sentential case. But, again, showing
this kind of thing takes real work, and it is far from obvious. Indeed, because of the
presence of “≡”, it is not even clear that this would hold in Begriffsschrift. See note 30.
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early 1880s. Boolean logic is an equational calculus, in which we find
such results as35
A× (B + C) = (A×B) + (A× C)
this being the Boolean version of the distributivity of conjuction over
disjunction. Frege was generally quite critical of the Booleans’ emphasis
on analogies between arithmetic and logic (AimCN, pp. 93–4; BLC, pp.
13–5). But surely he would have noticed the similarity between the
Booleans’ use of “=” and his own use of “≡”. It might even have seemed
to him confirmation of his view that “A ≡ B” expresses some sort of
identity. So the question again becomes: What is the same?
With this question in mind, consider again some remarks from “On
Sense and Reference” that we quoted above:
If our supposition that the reference of a sentence is its truth-
value is correct, then the latter must remain unchanged when
a part of the sentence is replaced by an expression with the
same reference. And this is in fact the case. . . . If we are
dealing with sentences for which the meaning of their com-
ponent parts is at all relevant, then what feature except the
truth-value can be found that belongs to such sentences quite
generally and remains unchanged by substitutions of the kind
just mentioned? (SM, op. 35)
We earlier dismissed this as an unsuccessful attempt to derive the Truth-
Value Thesis from the compositionality of reference. But we can now
see that there is more to it. Frege is gesturing in the direction of the
antinomy we have been discussing and indicating how he thinks it ought
to be solved. Unfortunately, this observation helps only a little, since,
while Frege does point out that truth-values will do the job, he still gives
us no reason to suppose that only truth-values will do the job.
It is still not clear, therefore, why Frege chooses truth-values to play
this role. To answer that question, we need to look at a different aspect
of the Truth-Value Thesis: one that is connected with the fact that
sentences can occur as parts of other sentences.
35 Notation varies among the various contributors to this tradition. We’ll use the one
in the text as it is relatively familiar.
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5 Sentential Connectives as Functions
In their landmark study The Development of Logic, William and Martha
Kneale (1962, pp. 420, 531) credit Frege with the discovery of truth-tables.
They are in good company. Ludwig Wittgenstein too seems to attribute
this discovery to Frege, though he is critical of Frege’s understanding of
truth-tables. He is reported to have said in 1935:36
It is important to see that [the truth-table for disjunction]
says nothing about the function p ∨ q, but is another way of
writing it. When Frege explained such functions by listing
the truth-values of the arguments in columns on one side and
the function on the other, it looked as though he had said
something about the function. But instead he had defined it,
given another notation for it. (Wittgenstein, 1979b, pp. 135ff)
The view Wittgenstein is attributing to Frege is of course very widespread
today. The truth-tables, many of us would suppose, are bound up with
the semantics of propositional logic; they embody a conception of how
the semantic value of a complex formula depends upon, and is deter-
mined by, the semantic values of its parts. Wittgenstein, on the other







as being a formula—a ‘propositional sign’—one we might otherwise write:
p ∨ q (Wittgenstein, 1961, 4.442).
It is not our present purpose to try to resolve this disagreement,
though it will be clear that we side with Frege. What we want to discuss
here, rather, is the source of Frege’s view that the sentential connectives—
in particular, negation and the conditional—are truth-functions. And
here again, the key to the investigation lies in the realization that this
view is not present in Frege’s earliest work.
Frege emphasizes in Begriffsschrift that, when we are considering a
binary sentential connective, we must distinguish four possible cases,
corresponding of course to the four lines of the truth-table. But although
36 Thanks to Michael Kremer for helping us locate this passage.
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a table of sorts does appear in Begriffsschrift, truth-tables do not, since
Frege does not mention the notion of truth in this connection: Frege sim-
ply does not say, in Begriffsschrift, that a conditional is false only when
its antecdedent is true and its consequent is false. Frege’s explanation of
the conditional reads, rather, as follows:
If A and B stand for contents that can become judgements. . . ,
there are the following four possibilities:
(1) A is affirmed and B is affirmed;
(2) A is affirmed and B is denied;
(3) A is denied and B is affirmed;




stands for the judgement that the third of these possibilities
does not take place, but one of the other three does. (Bg, §5,
emphasis original; see also BLC, p. 35)
Frege does not use this sort of language in his explanation of negation in
Begriffsschrift, but nor does he speak of truth:
If a short vertical stroke is attached to the content stroke,
then this will express the circumstance that the content does
not take place. So, for example,
A
means “A does not take place”. (Bg, §7)
The suggestion that negation and the conditional express truth-functions
is therefore wholly absent from Begriffsschrift and, indeed, does not
appear in any of Frege’s extant writings from before the 1890s.
Truth-functions appear for the first time in the lecture Function
and Concept. Shortly after completing the argument that functions
are ‘unsaturated’, Frege suggests that we should think of concepts too
as functions and then raises the question what their values might be,
explaining that he takes them to be truth-values (FC, op. 13). Once
the truth-values have been admitted as values of functions, however,
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it is then natural also to consider functions for which they are among
the arguments. Interesting cases include negation and the conditional,
and Frege clearly and explicitly explains these as truth-functions (FC,
opp. 20ff).37 That said, however, so far as we know, nowhere in his
later writings does Frege give the sort of ‘tabular’ account that both
Wittgenstein and the Kneales mention. Their crediting Frege with the
discovery of the truth-tables thus appears to rest upon their conflating
the tabular presentation in Begriffsschrift with the truth-functional
explanation of the connectives in Frege’s mature work. Putting these
together doesn’t require great insight, but the fact is that truth-tables
as such do not appear in Frege’s work. Moreover, there is no reason
to suppose that Frege realized, as both Wittgenstein and Emil Post
(1921) clearly did, that truth-tables can be used to decide the validity
of an arbitrary propositional formula. There is therefore no basis for
attributing the discovery of truth-tables to Frege. That honor belongs to
Wittgenstein and Post, as is now widely appreciated. Still, the discovery
of truth-functions is Frege’s, as we shall now see.
Perhaps surprisingly, the idea that the sentential operators express
functions is also absent from Begriffsschrift. Frege nowhere says that
they do express functions, and that is not plausibly an oversight, given
how concerned Frege is to establish the importance of the notion of func-
tion to logic. And there is indirect, but nonetheless impressive, evidence
that Frege did not regard the connectives as expressing functions when
he wrote Begriffsschrift.
One route to this conclusion would begin with a suggestion due to
Øystein Linnebo (2003): that the Frege of Begriffsschrift shared with Im-
manuel Kant (from whom he presumably inherited it) the doctrine that
37 The fact that, in his mature period, Frege regards truth-values are objects compli-
cates the situation, of course, since something like
1
0
is not only well-formed but true. This is because the horizontal strokes that form part of
the sign for the conditional are ‘horizontals’ in Frege’s proprietary sense (Gg, v. I, §12),
and so we may effectively regard the arguments as always being prefixed by horizontals
and so as being truth-values. This fact plays an important role in the argument of §31,
when Frege writes: “According to our specifications the names ‘ ∆’ and ‘ Γ
∆
’ always
have references if the names ‘ ∆’ and ‘ Γ’ refer to something”, thus disposing of the
question whether negation and the conditional have a reference. Frege makes a similar
move in the argument of §10.
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logic is concerned only with the form of thought and not with its content.
The notion of function would then belong only to content, whereas the
conditional is part of the form, and so conditionals would not be treated
as functions. The matter is unclear, however. The logical development
in Begriffsschrift is, indeed, in some sense concerned only with form,
but this may simply reflect a pragmatic decision on Frege’s part first to
show what of mathematical significance follows strictly from matters of
form before turning, as he does in Die Grundlagen, to the particulars of
content.
There is, however, a different route to much the same conclusion.
As Frege saw the matter in 1881, a “highly developed language” must
contain two kinds of signs, “material” and “formal”. In particular, a
lingua characterica for mathematics must contain both sorts of elements.
The material part of the language will include such symbols as “+” and
“×”. Frege compares the formal part of the language to the “prefixes,
suffixes, and auxiliary words” of natural language (BLC, p. 13), and the
traditional view was precisely that such expressions had no meaning of
their own. But the formal part, for Frege, includes most especially the
logical symbols, so it appears that he regards them as being essentially
without meaning and so certainly not as expressing functions. Rather,
they would have been treated as syncategorematic.
Why, then, did Frege abandon this traditional view? Frege’s emerging
logicism would have given him one reason. As Linnebo (2003, §3) notes,
whatever vestiges of the Kantian doctrine are present in Begriffsschrift
are clearly gone by Die Grundlagen: Arithmetical truths are supposed
to be logical truths, and Frege certainly did not think that arithmetic
is without content. Indeed, in “Formal Theories of Arithmetic”, Frege
carefully explains the difference between two senses in which a theory of
arithmetic can be ‘formal’, denying explicitly that arithmetic is formal in
the traditional sense (FTA, opp. 97ff).
Another reason is to be found in Frege’s reaction to criticisms of
Begrifsschrift itself and, in particular, in his belated encounter with the
work of Boole. Six reviews of Begriffsschrift were published,38 among
which was a condescending review written by Schröder (1972) in which
he accused Frege of having ignored the accomplishments of Boole and
his followers:
38 These are collected in the edition of Begriffsschrift edited by Tyrell Bynum (Frege,
1972).
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With the exception of what is said. . . about ‘function’ and
‘generality’ and up to [Part III], the book is devoted to the es-
tablishment of a formula language that essentially coincides
with Boole’s mode of presenting judgements and Boole’s cal-
culus of judgements, and which certainly in no way achieves
more. (Schröder, 1972, p. 221, emphasis original)
Schröder (1972, p. 220) speculates that Frege was ignorant of Boole’s
work, as does John Venn (1972, p. 234) in his review.39 They were almost
certainly right. As Tyrell Bynum (1972, pp. 77–8) points out, Frege took
no courses in logic as a student, and some of his claims to originality
reveal his ignorance of Boole.
It is no surprise that Frege should emphasize in his various replies
(AimCN; BLC; BLF) how badly Schröder has failed to appreciate the sig-
nificance of what Frege has to say “about ‘function’ and ‘generality’ ”. But
Frege’s response is not limited to this point. His more potent criticism is
that Boole’s treatment of logic is fundamentally misconceived. For Boole,
logic consists of two parts, which he calls the ‘calculus of judgements’
and the ‘calculus of concepts’. The former is essentially what we now
know as propositional logic; the latter has the same scope as traditional
Aristotelian logic, treating of the sorts of relations between concepts ex-
pressed by “All F are G”, “Some F are G”, and so forth. Boole treats the
calculus of concepts as fundamental and attempts to reduce the calculus
of judgements to it. Frege argues not only that Boole’s attempted reduc-
tion fails but, more generally, that Boole is wrong to treat the calculus of
concepts as fundamental.
Here is how Boole’s reduction works. The languages of the two
calculi are the same. Both contain expressions of the forms “A × B”,
“A + B”, “A¯”, and so forth. In the calculus of concepts, the variables
are supposed denote classes (or extensions of concepts):40 subsets of
39 Venn never seems to have gotten over it. In the second edition of his Symbolic
Logic, published in 1894, he writes of Begriffsschrift: “Here. . . we have an instance of an
ingenious man working out a scheme—in this case a very cumbrous one—in apparent
ignorance that anything better of the kind had ever been attempted before” (Venn, 1894,
pp. 493–4). Schröder did eventually recognize the nature of Frege’s accomplishment, but
Venn apparently never did, and he seems to have known nothing of Frege’s later work.
40 We shall not pursue the matter here, but the fact that extensions of concepts are
so critical to the Boolean tradition makes it a natural suggestion that Frege’s own
interest in extensions, which appear first in Die Grundlagen (Gl, §68), was also due to
his encounter with Boole. As we noted earlier, the notion of unsaturatedness emerges
at about the same time, and that is probably what enforced, for Frege, a distinction
between concepts and extensions (cf. Heck, 2019).
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the ‘universe of discourse’. The operations are then interpreted set-
theoretically, in the now familiar way: Multiplication is intersection;
addition is union;41 the bar represents the complement relative to the
universe. Precisely how the operations were to be interpreted in the
calculus of judgements was more controversial. One might expect that
they would denote truth-values, but that would be wrong.42 The whole
point—what makes Boole’s reduction possible—is that they again denote
classes. What is controversial is what these classes contain as members,
i.e., what sorts of things the universe of discourse comprises in the
calculus of judgements. In The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, Boole
(1847, pp. 48ff) takes the sentential variables to denote sets of ‘cases’ or
‘circumstances’. But he became dissatisfied with this view because it
“. . . involves the necessity of a definition of what is meant by a ‘case’. . . ”
(Boole, 1854, ch. XI, §16), and Boole thinks that will involve us in all
sorts of matters beyond the bounds of logic. So Boole takes a different
view in The Laws of Thought:
Let us take, as an instance for examination, the conditional
proposition “If the proposition X is true, the proposition Y is
true”. An undoubted meaning of this proposition is, that the
time in which the proposition X is true, is time in which the
proposition Y is true. (Boole, 1854, ch. XI, §5)
The letters thus denote classes of times: the times a proposition is
true. So the conditional proposition becomes a universal affirmative
proposition: All times at which X is true are times at which Y is true.
This is genius at its most twisted.
Boole’s reduction of the calculus of judgements to the calculus of
classes thus amounts to his treating the sentential operators “A × B”,
“A + B”, and “A¯” as expressing set-theoretic operations on the power
set of some universe, indeed, as expressing the very same set-theoretic
operations that “A × B”, “A + B”, and “A¯” express in the calculus of
classes. The controversy about what comprises the universe has proved
41 In fact, there is vigorous debate among the Booleans about whether ‘A+B’ should
be interpreted as union, which corresponds to inclusive disjunction, or to something
rather more complicated that corresponds to exclusive disjunction. These disagreements
are of no significance for the present discussion, however, so we shall ignore them.
42 Hugh MacColl (1877, pp. 9–10) comes closest to this conception, but his official
view is that the sentence-letters denote ‘statements’. Schröder mentions MacColl in his
review, but it is unclear if Frege ever read him. Frege mentions MacColl twice (AimCN,
p. 93; BLF, p. 15), but what he says is all but lifted from Schröder.
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not to be the crucial point. On the contrary, the flexibility inherent in
Boole’s approach has proven a positive advantage. Boole’s original view,
that makes reference to ‘cases’, inspired some of the earliest work on
modal logic, and his later view, that makes reference to times, had a
similar influence on tense logic. Indeed, Boole’s great insight is precisely
that, no matter what we take the universe to comprise, if we treat the
sentential operators as expressing set-theoretic operations on its power
set, then the algebra so determined is (what we now call) a Boolean
algebra, and it validates the laws of classical logic.
Blinded by the uncomprehending criticisms of his opponents, Frege
could no more see the importance of this discovery of Boole’s than
Schröder could see the importance of Frege’s notion of generality. But
we must nonetheless agree with Frege that Boole’s attempt to reduce
sentential logic to quantification theory is a failure, and not only for the
case of “eternal truths such as those of mathematics” (BLC, p. 15). What
is fundamental is sentential logic, and Frege goes so far as to describe
himself as reducing Boole’s ‘primary propositions’, such as universal affir-
mative propositions, to his ‘secondary’ propositions, such as conditionals
(BLC, pp. 17–8).
It is worth pausing over this point, because it reveals something
important about Frege’s early understanding of generality. What Frege
means is that, in his logic, a statement like “All Fs are G” becomes a




Note carefully the omission of the leading quantifier. Frege could not
have claimed to have reduced the calculus of classes to the calculus of




Nor would it have served Frege’s purposes to symbolize it as in (*)
were this simply short for (**), as it would be if free variables were
understood as tacitly bound by invisible universal quantifiers, as is often
supposed. How exactly Frege understands free variables in Grundgesetze
is a matter of some delicacy (see Heck, 2012a, §3.2), but it is clear how
he understood them in Begriffsschrift. Frege’s view at that time was that
generality is indicated by “letters”, that is, by variables (Bg, §1). This
contrasts with his mature view, where generality is expressed by the
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‘concavity’, that is, by the universal quantifier (which denotes a second-
level concept that is true of precisely those concepts that are true of all
objects). By contrast, Frege tells us in Begriffsschrift that the concavity
serves only to “delimit[] the scope that the generality indicated by the
letter covers” (Bg, §11, our emphasis). The concavity, that is to say, is
merely an indicator of scope, a piece of pure syntax; it has no meaning of
its own, and it is not a quantifier in the modern sense of that term.43
There is much more that could be said about this matter, but just
two points are important at present. The first is that Boole does not
treat the sentential connectives as expressing truth-functions. To be
sure, Boole recognizes the importance of the special case in which the
universe contains just one element. The calculations in which Boole is
interested are especially simple in this case, which is of course that of a
two-element Boolean algebra, with elements Boole would have denoted 1
and 0. But Boole simply does not interpret 1 and 0 as truth and falsity:
They denote the universe and the empty set. And the same seems to
have been true of Schröder, at least at the time he wrote his review of
Begriffsschrift. What Schröder (1972, p. 224) says about sentential logic
in the review is in agreement with what was quoted from Boole above.
So Boole did not treat the sentential connectives as expressing truth-
functions, so Frege did not get the idea that they do from Boole. But Boole
undoubtedly did treat the connectives as expressing functions. Boole’s
use of the arithmetical expressions “+” and “×” serves to emphasize
this point. And, as critical as Frege is of Boole’s over-reliance on the
analogy with arithmetic, it is hard to imagine that Frege would not have
been impressed by this element of Boole’s approach. It might even have
seemed to Frege a confirmation of his own emphasis on the importance
43 We have discussed this point in more detail elsewhere (Heck and May, 2013, §28.2),
and it has been noted by others, too. We have a dim memory of having encountered
it in the work of Peter Geach, but we cannot locate a reference. Gary Kemp (1995, p.
46, n. 12) mentions it in a footnote, but takes it to have been Frege’s view throughout
his career. That is clearly wrong: Frege explicitly says that in Grundgesetze that the
quantifers have a reference (Gg, v. I, §31), and he tells us explicitly what that is (Gg, v. I,
§§8, 24). What Kemp actually discusses in the footnote cited is Frege’s understanding of
Roman letters (i.e., free variables), which is a different matter. But, for what it is worth,
we do not think Frege thought of free variables as “conferring generality” in his mature
period either, though, as we have said, that matter is more delicate. The passage from
“Introduction to Logic” (IntLog, p. 190) that Kemp cites cannot establish the point on its
own. Frege’s point there is that, in something like (*), the variable takes scope over the
whole formula, not separately over its individual parts. This point could as well have
been made with bound variables, though these have not yet been introduced at that
point in the paper.
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of the notion of function to logic. Frege does not highlight this aspect of
Boole’s work in the critical pieces from 1881 and 1882—he is too busy
defending himself—but nor does he criticize it. So, although it may have
taken him a little while to assimilate it, it seems very plausible that
Frege did get the idea that the sentential connectives express functions
from his reading of Boole.
The significance of this transformation should not be underestimated,
quite independently of any correlative commitment to the truth-function-
ality of the connectives. It constitutes Frege’s final abandonment of
the traditional conception of logic as purely formal. That sentential
connectives express functions makes them, for Frege, of a piece not
only with the arithmetical expressions that belong to the ‘material’ part
of the language but with predicates quite generally. So, although the
distinction between the logical and non-logical parts of the language will
survive—Frege certainly would have regarded geometrical primtives as
non-logical, for example—that distinction can no longer be understood as
one between the formal and the contentful. And that, of course, is all to
the good, so far as the requirements of Frege’s logicism are concerned.44
Our present concern, however, is with the emergence of Frege’s views
about truth. So the next question we must ask, on Frege’s behalf, is
the one that must naturally arise once we have decided to treat the
sentential connectives as expressing functions, namely:45 What are the
arguments and values of these functions? At one time, of course, the
obvious thing for Frege to say would have been that the conditional
expresses a two-place function from contents to contents. But this option
is off the table now, due to the antinomy we discussed in Section 4.
Note first that the arguments of the sentential functions must be of
the same sort as their values: Since negation and the conditional embed
within one another, the value of the one becomes an argument of the
other. And the arguments of the connectives will plausibly be the same
as the values of concept-functions, too, since, in a formula like
Fb
Fa
44 Vestiges of this traditional view seem to survive at least into Quine (1970), whose
opposition to the logical status of second-order logic is otherwise hard to understand. Or,
at least some of his grounds are hard to understand. Why should it matter otherwise if
second-order logic admits of a complete proof procedure? Quine seems to be supposing,
quite without argument, that logic is essentially syntactic (cf. Boolos, 1975, pp. 525–6).
45 As said earlier, this question will only arise once Frege has stopped confusing
functions with expressions. But we are past that point now.
39
the values of the concept-function Fξ become the arguments of the
conditional.46 We know what Frege’s mature view was: All of these are
truth-values. But what leads him to that view?
Recall Frege’s explanation of the conditional in Begriffsschrift:
If A and B stand for contents that can become judgements. . . ,
there are the following four possibilities:
(1) A is affirmed and B is affirmed;
(2) A is affirmed and B is denied;
(3) A is denied and B is affirmed;




stands for the judgement that the third of these possibilities
does not take place, but one of the other three does. (Bg, §5,
emphasis removed)
The language of affirmation and denial is not only quaint but misplaced,
as Frege himself would eventually come to realize: When one asserts
a conditional, one is not thereby affirming or denying its antecedent or
consequent, and one is not saying anything about whether anyone else
should affirm or deny them, either. This is essentially what Peter Geach
(1965) famously called “the Frege point”, and it is closely connected with
what Frege himself called “the dissociation of assertoric force from the
predicate” (IntLog, p. 185).
The crucial observation is, yet again, that Frege changes his view
about this matter. There are certainly intimations of the Frege point in
Begriffsschrift, e.g, in §2. But it is not, contrary to what Geach (1965, p.
449) claims, ever actually stated there. If Frege had fully appreciated the
Frege point at that time, he could not have explained the conditional as
he does, in terms of affirmation and denial. Such language continues to
46 None of this is absolutely necessary, due to the presence of the horizontal, or content-
stroke, in Frege’s language. If concept-functions had conceptual contents for their values
(or circumstances, or whatever), then “ ξ” might yet be understood as expressing a
function from conceptual contents to truth-values—as in effect being a truth-predicate—
and then everything would still fit together. It is even possible that Frege at some time
held this sort of position, though we know of nowhere that he expresses it.
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appear in the writings on Boole from 1881 and 1882, especially “Boole’s
Logical Formula-language” (BLF, esp. p. 50), but it does not appear
later. So, at some point between 1882 and 1884—when, as we have seen,
the Truth-Value Thesis is certainly in place—Frege must have become
dissatisfied with his use of such language, probably for the reason we
have just recalled.
When he does abandon the language of affirmation and denial, how-
ever, Frege is faced with a problem: He needs a new way to explain the
conditional; he needs, in particular, to reconstruct his table of possibili-
ties. In the writings from 1881 and 1882, Frege sometimes presents the
table this way (BLC, p. 35; BLF, p. 49):
(1) A and B;
(2) A and not-B;
(3) not-A and B;
(4) not-A and not-B.
So long as one is not thinking of the conditional as expressing a function,
then this will do. But once Frege has decided that the conditional ought
to be understood as expressing a function, this form of explanation will
no longer do, for now we must ask what the arguments and values of the
function expressed by the conditional are, and simply listing the cases in
this way does not answer that question. If that is the question, however,
then it is not hard to see how, after his encounter with Boole, Frege
might eventually have been struck by the answer: What is relevant is
not whether A and B are affirmed or denied, but just whether they are
true or false, and the arguments and values of the sentential connectives
are ‘truth-values’.
Once this idea is in place, Frege’s other problem gets resolved, too.
As said previously, the arguments of the connectives are the values of
the concept-functions, since, in a formula like
Fb
Fa
the values of the concept-function Fξ become the arguments of the
conditional. So concepts are functions from objects to truth-vaules. The
fact that the elements of this package fit so nicely together then becomes,
for Frege, yet another reason to think it must be right.
41
In the end, then, Frege’s argument for the view that sentences refer
to truth-values is, as we said earlier, broadly pragmatic: It solves a lot
of problems. Taking sentences to refer to truth-values tells us what the
values of concept-functions are and it gives us the powerful notion of
truth-functionality. In short, the idea that sentences refer to truth-values
ties up a bunch of loose ends. So it is no surprise that Frege should boast
in Grundgesetze of “how much simpler and more precise everything is
made by the introduction of truth-values” (Gg, v. I, p. x). Though he
might have added: It would help to look at my earlier work so as to get a
sense for how messy things used to be.
6 Closing
Our story of how truth came to play a central role in Frege’s philosophy
of logic is now complete. But, as we noted at the end of Section 4, Frege’s
position still is not quite stable. Taking sentences to refer to truth-values
tells us how we can weaken “≡” so that
` c = d→ Fc ≡ Fd
might be true but harmless. Indeed, it can now be reformulated simply
as
` c = d→ Fc = Fd
as it is in Frege’s mature work, with an identity between sentences being
true just in case they have the same truth-value. But other problems
loom, as Frege himself notes in “On Sense and Reference”:47
If now the truth-value of a sentence is its meaning, then on
the one hand all true sentences have the same meaning and
so, on the other hand, do all false sentences. From this we
see that in the meaning of the sentence all that is specific is
obliterated. (SM, op. 35)
And the problem is not just that this might seem strange. The problem
is that we now have no way to understand the nature of inference.
As we have emphasized, an inference, for Frege, is a transition be-
tween judgements, and the correctness of such an inference is supposed
47 We here translate “Bedeutung” as meaning, rather than reference. One simply
cannot appreciate the force of the worry otherwise: that all true sentences mean the
same thing.
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to be determined by the contents of those judgements: Sameness of
content is supposed to imply sameness of logical relations; differences of
content are to be recognized only where the logical relations are different.
But if “in the meaning of the sentence all that is specific is obliterated”,
then content can be meaning only if all true sentences, and all false
sentences, have the same logical properties, which is absurd. There
must, therefore, be another sort of content, one that is more fine-grained,
in terms of which the correctness of inferences can be characterized.
The problem with which the Truth-Value Thesis leaves Frege is thus
one that is utterly central to his conception of logic. Frege wanted to
insist that logic is, in a sense, formal, but not in the sense that logic is
concered only with form. On the contrary, the task of logic is to uncover
the laws of truth, and there is no truth without content. More precisely,
inferences of the form
A→ B,A ` B
are, Frege wants to insist, valid not in virtue of formal relations between
the symbols that appear in these formulae but in virtue of semantic
relations between the contents expressed by the formulae. Logic is
formal only in so far as formal relations between symbols can be made to
reflect semantic relations between contents.
The problem that animates Frege’s mature philosophy is how this
idea might be reconciled with seemingly incompatible demands. On the
one hand, Frege’s insistence that logic must concern itself with truth
leads him to say that the conditional itself expresses a truth-function,
one that will not permit B to be false if both A and A→ B are true. That
is why the inference is valid. But, on the other hand, if the conditional
expresses a function, then, once it is given some arguments, it will, so to
speak, apply itself to them and hand us a value. From the point of view
of meaning, then, all we have is
>,> ` >
and nothing about modus ponens follows from that triviality. What we
seem to need is a way of holding the arguments apart from the function,
so that they are not obliterated by functional application, obscuring the
nature of the inference. We need, that is to say, is to find some way to
retain the structural features of a sentence in its content, and the broader
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lesson of the substitution argument is that the notions of function and
argument are ill-suited to this purpose.48
Frege’s proposal, in his mature work, is that we should regard A
and B as expressing ‘thoughts’ that are themselves components of the
thought expressed by “A→ B”. But this only leaves us with several more
questions. The most obvious is how exactly the thought expressed by the
conditional is supposed to be composed from the thoughts expressed by
its parts. We have discussed that question elsewhere (Heck and May,
2010). But there is an even more pressing question. It was in terms of
a relation between their truth-values that we explained the validity of
the inference from the judgement that A→ B and the judgement that A
to the judgement that B. If we are still to endorse such an explanation,
then we need to understand how this relation among the truth-values
of these thoughts depends upon the structural relations among them.
More generally, we need to understand how thoughts are related to their
truth-values. No relation between thoughts can make an inference valid
unless there is some such relation—not if inference is to have anything
to do with truth or, better, with knowledge, as both Frege’s logicism and
common sense require.
Frege’s solution to this problem is that we should regard the relation
of a thought to its truth-value as that of sense to reference. What this
might mean, unfortunately, is still far from clear. Part of what it means,
or so we would venture to suggest, is that, as Dummett (1993c) would
have put it, truth is the central notion of semantics. But how exactly
Frege’s idea should be developed is a question we shall have to leave for
another time.49
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